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 Petitioner Jordana Vera (also known as Jordana Vera-
Sera) (“Vera”), a citizen of Argentina, seeks review of a 
removal order of the Department of Homeland Security (“the 
Department”).1
                                                 
1 Throughout this opinion we refer to the agency enforcing the 
applicable law and regulations as the Department of Homeland 
Security.  In point of fact, however, the Department was not 
established until after Vera entered this country.  See Homeland 
Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 101, 116 Stat. 
2135, 2142.  The Homeland Security Act integrated all or parts 
of 22 different federal departments and agencies, including as 
relevant to this case the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
and the Customs Service.  Thus our references to the 
Department are sometimes to its predecessor agency.   
  The Department ordered Vera removed for 
staying beyond the 90 days that she was permitted to stay 
pursuant to the Visa Waiver Program (“VWP”), under which she 
entered this country.  Vera contends that the Department’s 
removal order is invalid because the government failed to show 
that she waived her right to contest her removal under the VWP 
and she did not receive the due process procedural protections to 
which she contends she would have been entitled under the Fifth 
Amendment in the absence of such a waiver.  Vera also argues 
that, because she was a minor when she entered this country, she 
could not at that time either explicitly or implicitly waive any 




order of removal.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny her 
petition for review. 
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 On September 8, 2000, when she was 12 years old, Vera, 
accompanied by her father,2 entered the United States through 
the VWP.3  Recently, in Bradley v. Attorney General
                                                 
2 We are uncertain as to whether Vera’s mother accompanied 
her.   
, 603 F.3d 
 
3In her opening brief in this Court, Vera did not concede 
expressly that she entered the United States pursuant to the 
VWP.  But the government in its answering brief pointed out 
that Vera stated that she was admitted under the VWP in the 
Record of Sworn Statement that she executed when Immigration 
and Custom Enforcement officers took her into custody and that 
her father, in an affidavit submitted on her behalf, made the 
same representation.  Though she had the opportunity in her 
reply brief to contest the government’s representation of the 
contents of those documents she did not do so nor does she deny 
now that she entered the United States under the auspices of the 
VWP.  Moreover, she does not contend that she entered the 
United States on any basis other than under the VWP.  In these 
circumstances, we are satisfied that she entered pursuant to the 
VWP.  We also point out that there is no indication in the briefs 
or the record on the petition before us that she ever has left this 
country since the time of her entry.   
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235, 238 (3d Cir. 2010), we described the pertinent components 
of the VWP:  
Under the VWP, a qualifying 
visitor may enter the United States 
without obtaining a visa, so long as 
a variety of statutory and regulatory 
requirements are met.  Among 
other things, a visitor seeking 
admission under the VWP must 
execute certain immigration forms, 
present a passport from a qualifying 
country, and possess a round-trip 
ticket.  8 U.S.C. § 1187(a).  Once 
admitted under the VWP, a visitor 
may remain in the United States for 
90 days.  8 U.S.C. § 1187(a). 
 Visitors to the United States admitted pursuant to the 
VWP must waive certain procedural rights afforded other aliens 
within this country before they may be removed without their 
consent.  Thus, as we indicated in Bradley, “[m]ost significantly, 
a VWP visitor must waive his or her rights to contest the 
government’s admissibility determinations and removal actions, 
except that the alien may contest removal actions on the basis of 
asylum.”  603 F.3d at 208 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)-(b)).  The 
Department has implemented this statutory requirement through 
regulations requiring that a VWP applicant, prior to admission 
to the United States, present United States officers with a 
completed, signed Form I-94W, Nonimmigrant Visa Waiver 
Arrival/Departure Form,” 8 C.F.R. § 217.2(b)(1) (2000), which 
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contains an express waiver of any possible right to contest 
admissibility determinations and removal actions.4  A visitor’s 
execution of the Form I-94W waiver is an “ironclad” 
requirement; “[i]ndeed, a VWP applicant may not be provided a 
waiver [of visa requirements] under the program unless the alien 
has signed a VWP waiver, [8 U.S.C. § 1187(b)], and an 
applicant who does not sign will be refused admission and 
removed, see 8 C.F.R. § 217.4(a)(1).”  Bradley, 603 F.3d at 238 
(internal quotation marks omitted).5
                                                 
4We reference the regulations in effect at the time Vera entered 
the United States though we note that those regulations do not 
differ as significant here from the more current regulations to 
which Bradley evidently cited.   
   
  
5In full, the VWP’s waiver provision states: 
 
An alien may not be provided a waiver under the 
program unless the alien has waived any right- 
 
(1) to review or appeal under this chapter 
of an immigration officer’s determination 
as to the admissibility of the alien at the 
port of entry into the United States, or 
 
(2) to contest, other than on the basis of an 
application for asylum, any action for 
removal against the alien. 
 
8 U.S.C. § 1187(b) (2000).   
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 So far as we are aware neither the statute authorizing the 
establishment of the VWP nor its implementing regulations 
make any exception to the requirement for the execution of the 
waiver in the case of a minor, and the parties in their briefs do 
not suggest that there is any such provision.  In a procedure 
differing from that applicable in cases in which aliens were 
admitted on bases other than under the VWP, the determination 
of whether a VWP entrant will be removed is made “by the 
district director who has jurisdiction over the place where the 
alien is found, and shall be effected without referral of the alien 
to an immigration judge for a determination of deportability.”  8 
C.F.R. § 217.4(b) (2000).6
 It is undisputed that Vera remained in the United States 
for many years beyond the time that the VWP authorized her to 
stay, and that she still remains here.  But Vera’s long and 
apparently undisturbed unlawful stay in the United States was 
interrupted on July 22, 2011, when, during their execution of a 
warrant for the arrest of her brother, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (“ICE”) officers discovered that Vera was in the 
United States.  At that time the ICE officers took Vera into 
custody, and while in custody she completed a Record of Sworn 
Statement regarding her entry and status in the United States in 
which she confirmed that she entered the United States pursuant 
to the VWP.  That same day, the Department issued a warrant 
for her arrest and removal, and ICE also issued to Vera a 
“Notice of Intent to Deport for Violating the Terms of Your 
   
                                                 
6 There is an exception to this provision, not applicable in this 




Admission Under Section 217 [of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (“INA”)].”7
[ICE] has determined that you 
entered the United States pursuant 
to Section 217 of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act.  Accordingly, 
you executed a Form I-791, Visa 
Waiver Program Information Form 
that explained to you the conditions 
of admission under the Visa Waiver 
Program.  When you signed Form 
I-791, you also waived your right to 
contest deportability before an 
immigration judge and the Board of 
Immigration Appeals, and to any 
judicial review of any and all of the 
above decisions.   
  That document stated: 
[ICE] has determined that you have 
violated the terms of your 
admission under Section 217 . . . on 
the grounds that: 
You have remained in the United 
                                                 
7The Visa Waiver Program originally was entitled the “Visa 
Waiver Pilot Program” and was enacted as section 217 of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act.  See Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 




States for a time longer than 
permitted. 
App. at 4.8
 In conformity with the provisions of the VWP, following 
the time that the ICE officers took Vera into custody there were 
no proceedings before an immigration judge to determine her 
removability.  Rather, the Department promptly scheduled her 
for forthwith removal on August 4, 2011.  On that date, 
however, she refused to board the aircraft and thus she did not 
depart.
   
9
                                                 
8The “Notice of Intent to Deport” refers to Vera’s execution of a 
Form I-791, while the pertinent statutes and regulations in place 
as of Vera’s entry required that a VWP visitor execute a form I-
94W.  Those regulations referencing Form I-791 label that form 
as a “Visa Waiver Pilot Program Information Form,” while 
labeling the I-94W as a “Nonimmigrant Visa Waiver 
Arrival/Departure Form.”  8 C.F.R. § 299.1 (2000).  We do not 
find the variation in forms to be of great concern as the 
significant question remains the same: whether at the time of her 
entry into the United States Vera executed a waiver of her right 
to contest her removal. 
  Instead, Vera filed a timely petition for review with this 
 
9 We are surprised that an alien ordered removed can frustrate 
the removal process simply by refusing to board the aircraft 
available to take her to the country of removal.  We would have 
thought that measures would be in place to effectuate an order 




Court on August 8, 2011, requesting that we vacate the order of 
removal and direct the Department to release her or provide her 
with the ordinary removal process, including a hearing before a 
neutral arbiter. 
III.  STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), we have jurisdiction 
over “final orders of removal.”  See Khouzam v. Attorney Gen., 
549 F.3d 235, 247 (3d Cir. 2008).  The parties’ briefs and the 
record before us do not make clear whether the Department 
issued a removal order directed to Vera following the issuance 
of the “Notice of Intent to Deport,” an omission that causes us to 
pause before concluding that there has been a final order of 
removal in this case over which we can exercise jurisdiction on 
a petition for review.10  Nevertheless, in other cases we have 
treated documents to be final orders of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(1) that, as is true here, by their titles might seem to be 
something less than final provided that the documents were 
coupled with agency action so that the documents and the action 
together had the effect of “an order . . . concluding that the alien 
is [removable] or ordering [removal].”  See Khouzam
                                                 
10We think it likely that the Department did not issue any order 
after the Notice of Intent to Deport as the briefs do not refer to 
any such order.  
, 549 F.3d 
at 247 (concluding that the Department’s decision to terminate 
petitioner’s deferral of removal, which decision made petitioner 
“eligible for, and apparently subject to, imminent removal” was 
an “‘order of removal’ under section 1252”).  We are satisfied 
that the Department’s near deportation of Vera demonstrates 
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that even if the Department did not issue a document styled as a 
final order of removal addressed to Vera, that the “Notice of 
Intent to Deport” was, in effect, a final order of removal.  Thus, 
we have jurisdiction over Vera’s petition for review.  See 
Bradley
IV.  ANALYSIS 
, 603 F.2d at 237 n.1 (concluding that 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(1) provides jurisdiction to review final orders of 
removal in cases involving VWP entrants).   
 The government has been unable to produce the signed 
waiver that it contends that Vera must have executed pursuant to 
the VWP when she entered the United States.  Vera contends 
that this inability creates a presumption that she did not execute 
such a waiver and she accordingly was entitled to due process, 
including a hearing before a neutral arbiter, prior to being 
removed.  The government responds that because Vera concedes 
that she entered the United States through the VWP, in light of 
the statutory and regulatory requirements that VWP entrants 
execute a waiver before being admitted, the government is 
entitled to the benefit of a rebuttable presumption that Vera 
executed a waiver.  We agree that under Bradley
 In 
 the government 
is entitled to a presumption that Vera executed the waiver, and 
we further believe that the presumption has not been rebutted 
here. 
Bradley, a case similar in some respects to this case, 
the petitioner, Bradley, conceded that he had been admitted 
pursuant to the VWP and had stayed beyond the 90-day limit 
allowed.  Nevertheless he contended that the government’s 
failure to produce his signed I-94W form rendered his removal 
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invalid because the government was required to prove that he 
executed such a waiver by “clear, unequivocal, and convincing 
evidence” in accordance with Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 
285-86, 87 S.Ct. 483, 488 (1966).  603 F.3d at 237-39.  We 
rejected Bradley’s argument, as we concluded that even if the 
Woodby standard applied to waivers required by the VWP for 
admission into the United States,11 the government met its 
burden because of Bradley’s concession that he entered the 
United States through the VWP, his declaration that he signed “a 
form” that he handed to the Customs Officer upon entering the 
United States, and that he thereafter was admitted to the United 
States.  Id. at 239.  The government provided further evidence in 
support of its position by submitting the top, unsigned portion of 
a Form I-94W bearing Bradley’s name, date of birth, and his 
date of admission.12  Id.  We found that this evidence became 
“nearly irrefutable in view of the regulations and procedures 
governing admission under the VWP,” which preclude entry 
into the United States without execution of a waiver.  Id.  We 
held that “[b]ecause ‘agency action . . . is entitled to a 
presumption of regularity,’ McLeod v. INS
                                                 
11Notably, we expressed “doubt [as to] Bradley’s assumption 
that the Department must prove his waiver by ‘clear, 
unequivocal, and convincing evidence.’”  Bradley, 603 F.3d at 
239. 
, 802 F.2d 89, 95 n.8 
 
12“During the admission process, [t]he departure record at the 
bottom of the form is retained by the alien, while the 
immigration official admitting the alien keeps the top portion, 
including the signed waiver.”  Bradley, 603 F.3d at 239 (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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(3d Cir. 1986), we presume that the Department admitted 
Bradley under the VWP only after collecting the top portion of 
his completed I-94W form, including his signed VWP waiver.”  
Id.
 Although the record in 
  
Bradley, unlike the record here, 
included the petitioner’s declaration and the top, unsigned 
portion of the I-94W, we find the reasoning of the opinion in 
that case to be compelling here.  Vera admitted or at least did 
not deny that she entered the United States pursuant to the VWP, 
and her father’s sworn affidavit essentially conclusively 
establishes that she entered the United States on that authority.  
As noted, a VWP applicant must present a “completed, signed 
Form I-94W, Nonimmigrant Visa Waiver Arrival/Departure 
Form,” which contains the VWP waiver, prior to admission.  8 
C.F.R. § 217.2(b)(1) (2000).  An alien may not be admitted 
pursuant to the VWP “unless the alien has waived any right . . . 
to contest . . . any action for removal,” 8 U.S.C. § 
1187(b)(2)(2000), and an alien who does not sign the VWP 
waiver will be refused admission and removed from the United 
States, see 8 C.F.R. § 217.4(a)(1) (2000).  Vera does not direct 
our attention to any evidence that could rebut the presumption 
that the Department followed its own regulations in admitting 
her under the VWP.  We therefore presume that Vera, as a VWP 
entrant, executed the statutorily-required waiver prior to her 
entry.13
                                                 
13 Although Vera was a minor when she entered the United 
States she was not of such tender years that she could not 
possibly have executed the waiver.  We hasten to add, however, 
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 We recognize that our holding in this case is contrary to 
that of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in an opinion 
on which Vera understandably relies in a case involving facts 
somewhat similar to those here.14  In Galluzzo v. Holder, 633 
F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2011), the court refused to find that a VWP 
entrant had executed a waiver because, as is true here, the 
government did not provide a signed I-94W or any explicit 
evidence that the alien had executed the waiver.  Id. at 115.  We 
recognize also that courts generally “indulge every reasonable 
presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional 
rights.”  Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 
1023 (1938) (emphasis added) (stating so in the context of 
waiver of Sixth Amendment right to counsel); see also Fuentes 
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94 n.31, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 2001 n.31 (1972) 
(“In the civil area, the Court has said that we do not presume 
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.  Indeed, in the 
civil area no less than the criminal area, courts indulge every 
reasonable presumption against waiver.”) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting Ohio Bell 
Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 301 U.S. 292, 307, 57 S.Ct. 
724, 731 (1937), and Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 
393, 57 S.Ct. 809, 812 (1937)); Bayo v. Napolitano
                                                                                                             
that we are not implying that even if she had been of such a 
tender age our result would have been different.  Instead, we 
leave the question of how the VWP is applied when the alien to 
be removed was of tender years when she entered the country to 
another day when it is necessary to answer it.  See infra note 18. 
, 593 F.3d 
 
14 Vera also relies on a not precedential opinion from another 
court of appeals but we do not give that opinion any weight. 
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495, 503 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (concluding that the waiver 
standard in immigration cases is “perhaps not quite as strict as 
the one applicable to criminal cases [as articulated in Zerbst
 Despite the exacting standard against which a claimed 
waiver of constitutional rights must be judged, we find it 
unreasonable to conclude that, on the one hand, Vera was 
admitted pursuant to the VWP, as she concedes, but, on the 
other hand, she refused or otherwise failed to sign a waiver.  The 
controlling statutes and regulations are clear: a VWP applicant 
may not be admitted without waiving her right to contest 
removal, 8 U.S.C. § 1187(b)(2) (2000); 8 C.F.R. § 217.2(b)(1) 
(2000), and an applicant who refuses to execute such a waiver is 
denied entry to the United States, 
], 
[but it] must reflect the Supreme Court’s recognition of the 
unique character of [removal proceedings]”).   
see 8 C.F.R. § 217.4(a)(1) 
(2000).  Vera has not provided us with any reason to believe that 
the Department, in violation of its own regulations, admitted her 
without requiring that she sign a waiver, and in the absence of 
such evidence we will not indulge the unsupported presumption 
that she and the Department both circumvented the “linchpin” 
legal requirement of the VWP.  See Handa v. Clark
 Indeed, we think that even though the government 
contends that it is entitled to only a rebuttable presumption that 
Vera signed the waiver, in view of the circumstance that this 
, 401 F.3d 
1129, 1135 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he linchpin of the [VWP] 
program is the waiver, which assures that a person who comes 
here with a VWP visa will leave on time and will not raise a 
host of legal and factual claims to impede his removal if he 
overstays.”).   
 
 16 
case involves the VWP, we should be particularly circumspect 
before finding that the presumption has been rebutted.15  In 
being circumspect we take into account the cases that we have 
cited establishing an exacting standard for waiver of 
constitutional rights, but we nevertheless follow this particularly 
cautious approach because the presumptively executed waiver 
was joined with an application for entry into the United States.  
This joinder is critical because Vera is an alien and thus her 
request to enter the United States was statutorily based as it was 
without any constitutionally protected or even favored basis.  
See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32, 103 S.Ct. 321, 329 
(1982).  In this regard, we point out that Congress may prescribe 
such requirements as it seems fit for an alien to be admitted into 
this country.  See Kleindienst v. Mandel
 There is a second and independent basis for our result.  
Even if Vera did not sign a waiver, or if she signed a waiver that 
was invalid because she was a minor when she signed it, she 
, 408 U.S. 753, 770, 92 
S.Ct. 2576, 2585 (1972) (“In summary, plenary congressional 
power to make policies and rules for exclusion of aliens has 
long been established.”).  Of course, if an alien applicant for 
admission will not sign a waiver, she simply will not be 
admitted. 
                                                 
15 The government does not contend that the presumption was 
irrebutable so that regardless of the actual facts Vera will be 
deemed to have signed the waiver.  See B&G Constr. Co. v. 
Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 662 F.3d 
233, 254 (3d Cir. 2011) (statute creating “irrebutable 
presumption” sets forth a rule of “substantive law”).  Thus, we 
do not consider that possibility. 
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suffered no prejudice.  Vera’s contention with respect to the 
effect of her age at the time of the waiver’s execution, if she 
signed such a waiver, brings to bear an argument that Bradley 
advanced regarding the enforceability of VWP waivers.  Bradley 
contended that a VWP waiver must be entered into knowingly 
and voluntarily to be enforceable and that he was too intoxicated 
at the time he purportedly signed the waiver to have executed 
that document knowingly and voluntarily.  603 F.3d at 240.  We 
noted that “[i]n all respects, Bradley’s claim amounts to a 
challenge of his removal order under the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment, and consequently, he cannot prevail 
without ‘an initial showing of substantial prejudice.’”  Id. 
(quoting Khan v. Attorney Gen., 448 F.3d 226, 236 (3d Cir. 
2006)).  We thus determined that “even assuming without 
deciding that Bradley’s VWP waiver must be ‘knowing and 
voluntary,’ Bradley cannot invalidate his removal order unless 
he can demonstrate he was ‘substantially prejudiced’ by his 
allegedly unknowing waiver.”16
 We held that Bradley could not demonstrate prejudice 
and in so concluding adopted the reasoning of the en banc Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in 
 
Bayo, 593 F.3d 495.  In 
Bayo, a case similar to both this case and Bradley
                                                 
16In Bradley we recognized that the Courts of Appeals for the 
Fifth and Seventh Circuits have found that VWP waivers must 
be knowing and voluntary to be effective.  603 F.3d at 240 
(citing Bayo, 593 F.3d 495; Nose v. Attorney Gen., 993 F.2d 75, 
79 (5th Cir. 1993)).   
, the petitioner 
asserted that he did not knowingly and voluntarily execute the 
VWP waiver because the waiver was in English, a language that 
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he could not speak or read.  In finding that the petitioner in Bayo
Had he known what the waiver 
said, Bayo would have had two 
options, either of which would have 
led to summary removal.  If he had 
signed the waiver anyway, knowing 
full well what it said, he would be 
in the same situation as he is now.  
If he had refused to sign, he would 
have been removed summarily at 
the border because he did not have 
a proper visa.  Perhaps there is a 
slight chance that after removal, 
Bayo could have obtained a visa to 
come to the United States, and then 
he might have settled in Indiana, 
met [the American citizen he 
married following entrance through 
the VWP], and married her, 
allowing him to adjust his status 
based on marriage at that time.  As 
Bayo admits in his brief though, 
‘[i]t is difficult to compare what 
might have been with what is.’  
This is true, and it is the reason 
why we find the explanation of how 
Bayo might have been harmed too 
speculative to support a showing of 
prejudice. 
 
could not demonstrate prejudice the court explained: 
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593 F.3d at 506.   
 We concluded that Bradley, like Bayo, was unable to 
“show he has been prejudiced by an unknowing or involuntary 
waiver because any harm would be too speculative.”  Bradley, 
603 F.3d at 240.  Reiterating the reasoning of Bayo, we found 
that “[t]he consequence [Bradley] now faces — summary 
removal — is the same consequence he would have faced had he 
known of the waiver and refused to sign . . . [and] he has failed 
to demonstrate how his knowledge of the waiver realistically 
could have changed this outcome.”  Id.
Bradley’s VWP waiver was an 
express condition precedent to his 
1996 entry to the United States, and 
he would not have been admitted 
without it.  The prejudice of which 
he complains — summary removal 
without a hearing — is a direct 
consequence of the VWP’s 
congressional design and 
implementing regulations, and not 
Bradley’s alleged failure to 
comprehend the terms of his VWP 
visitor status. . . .  To prevail on his 
due process claim, Bradley must 
demonstrate substantial prejudice 
resulting from the due process 
  In rejecting Bradley’s 
contention that prejudice should be measured at the time 
Bradley was denied process, not at the time of his entry to the 
United States, we explained: 
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violation he has alleged — his 
unknowing waiver of constitutional 
rights.  Accordingly, Bradley must 
prove that, but for his ignorance of 
the VWP waiver, he could 
otherwise contest his removal on 
the basis of his petition for 
adjustment of status.  This, he 
cannot do.  Had Bradley known the 
contents of the waiver and refused 
to sign, he would be in the same 
position as he is now — subject to 
summary removal without a 
hearing — and he would not now 
be eligible to adjust his status on 
the basis of his marriage to [an 
American citizen.]   
Id. at 241; see also Bingham v. Holder, 637 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 
2011) (relying on Bradley and Bayo
 Our prejudice analysis in 
 in holding that VWP entrant 
could not demonstrate prejudice on basis of an allegedly 
unknowing or involuntary waiver).   
Bradley, though based on 
markedly different facts, guides us in our determination in this 
case.  In a contention similar to that Bradley advanced, Vera 
contends that the government violated her Fifth Amendment 
right to due process by denying her a hearing because her waiver 
— if she executed one — was unenforceable by reason of her 
 
 21 
status as a minor at the time she executed that document.17  
Accordingly, Vera must demonstrate that enforcement of the 
allegedly defective waiver caused her substantial prejudice.  As 
was the case with respect to the petitioners in Bayo and Bradley, 
Vera cannot do this.  If Vera had been of majority age at the 
time she entered the United States and otherwise knowingly and 
voluntarily had executed the waiver, she would be in precisely 
the position she is in now — facing summary removal.  She 
would not have been entitled to the procedural protections 
normally afforded to an alien prior to removal, the denial of 
which Vera contends causes her substantial prejudice.  See 
Pet’r’s br. at 15 (claiming prejudice on the basis of inability to 
challenge the illegality of her arrest, to receive a bond hearing, 
and to adjust her status on the basis of marriage).  If Vera had 
refused to sign the waiver when attempting to enter the United 
States, she would have been denied entry because she did not 
have a visa at that time and could not have entered pursuant to 
the VWP.  Vera thus fails to show how enforcement of the 
allegedly defective waiver if she signed a waiver or the 
enforcement of the VWP removal procedure even if she did not 
sign a waiver has prejudiced her.18
                                                 
17Whether Vera’s objection is cast as a contention that a minor’s 
VWP waiver is ineffective per se or that Vera’s waiver 
otherwise was not knowingly or voluntarily executed, the legal 
predicate for the objection is the same and Bradley’s prejudice 
analysis applies.   
 
 
18We thus decide this case without determining whether Vera’s 
VWP waiver could not have been a knowing and voluntary 
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 Bradley likewise disposes of Vera’s claim that under 
Khouzam, 549 F.3d 235, substantial prejudice is presumed 
because Vera received no process at all before the attempt to 
remove her.  In Khouzam, we held that the “complete absence of 
any process” inherently and substantially prejudiced a non-VWP 
petitioner when the government terminated his deferral of 
removal under the Convention Against Torture.  549 F.3d at 
239-40, 258.  In Bradley, we distinguished Khouzam because 
the petitioner in Khouzam “did not waive his due process rights, 
and no statute conditioned his admission to the United States on 
an express waiver of these rights.”  603 F.3d at 241.  Finding 
“no inherent prejudice in the enforcement of an express due 
process waiver against an alien who has already received the 
benefit of that waiver,” we held that “in the VWP context, we 
will require the same showing of ‘substantial prejudice’ required 
for other due process challenges to orders of removal.”  Id. 
(citing Khan, 448 F.3d at 236).  As in Bradley
                                                                                                             
waiver because of her age at the time of her entry into the 
United States.  We observe, however, that the consequence of a 
decision that a minor cannot execute a valid waiver or the 
summary removal provisions of the VWP cannot be enforced 
against a minor could force the government to adopt a policy not 
to allow minors to enter this country pursuant to the VWP.  
After all, it seems obvious that the borders of this country 
should not be opened to minor aliens literally to walk in on the 
basis that they are temporary visitors but who then can refuse to 
leave and demand procedures to determine if they can be 
removed.  In this regard, we point out that our experience shows 
that removal proceedings frequently become both complicated 
and protracted. 
, Vera’s due 
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process claim thus fails because she cannot show that she 
suffered any prejudice, even if she did not sign the mandated 
waiver.   
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 In reaching our conclusion we mention four significant 
final points.  First, the principles of the common law make it 
plain that persons should not gain an advantage by their 
wrongful conduct and that is precisely what Vera is trying to do 
as she unlawfully has overstayed her 90-day authorization to be 
in this country and seeks to build on that unlawful conduct to 
remain longer.  Second, inasmuch as there is no doubt that Vera 
has been in this country illegally since 90 days after her 
admission, this case is not one in which an alien who was 
admitted legally nevertheless by reason of her later conduct may 
be subject to removal.  Quite to the contrary, Vera’s conduct 
after her admission is immaterial in these proceedings.19
                                                 
19 Thus, this case differs from Judulang v. Holder, 132 S.Ct. 476, 
490 (2011), where the Supreme Court was concerned about 
arbitrariness in removal proceedings against “lawful resident 
aliens.”  Vera is not a lawful resident alien. 
  Third, 
the VWP is a vast program pursuant to which, according to the 
government, in 2007 alone almost 16 million aliens were 
admitted to the United States.  Thus, the need for summary 
removal procedures to enforce the conditions of admittance 
under the VWP is obvious.  If individual hearings before already 
overworked immigration judges were required before an alien 
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admitted pursuant to the VWP could be removed summarily the 
program might become unmanageable.  Fourth, though some 
people might regard the outcome of this case to be harsh the fact 
remains that if people in other countries object to the conditions 
of their admission into the United States they are free not to 
come here.  In short, aliens either must accept the conditions of 
their admission or not enter this country.  The petition for review 
which seeks to vacate the Notice of Intent to Deport is denied.  
 
 
